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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Although researchers have documented the impact of real shocks on overall unemployment 
in OECD countries (Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Nickell, 1997; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; 
Nickell et al., 2005), very little attention has been paid to the impact of financial crises on 
unemployment. Yet, like preceding crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009), the 2008 financial 
crisis has resulted in a significant, and hitherto persistent, increase in unemployment in 
advanced economies, as illustrated in Figure 1. While many emerging market countries have 
generally weathered the crisis well, youth unemployment has increased (or stopped 
declining) at least temporarily, in several regions, including Latin America, the Middle East, 
and North Africa.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial crises contribute to an increase in unemployment mainly through the decline in 
output and investment associated with heightened uncertainty, higher risk premia (Pindyck, 
1991; Pindyck and Solimano, 1993), and tighter lending standards (Hall, 2009). Hysteresis 
effects related to the loss of attractiveness of the unemployed can also lead to an increase in 
long-term and structural unemployment (Ball, 2009). More vulnerable groups such as the 
youth and women with limited professional experience also become increasingly at risk, with 
their participation rate typically declining (Duval et al., 2011).  
 
This paper systematically measures the impact of financial crises on general, long-term, and 
youth unemployment in 140 countries. While the graph in Figure 1 is suggestive, we analyze 
formally the magnitude and persistence of the increase in unemployment resulting from 
financial crises. We also examine the extent to which the labor institutional and regulatory 
framework modulates the response of unemployment to financial crises. Following the work 
of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Nickell et al. (2005), and Bassanini and Duval (2009) on 
the role of institutions in explaining the unemployment response to macroeconomic or 
unobserved shocks, we look at the direct impact of labor market institutions on 
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Figure 1. The evolution of unemployment across the regions
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unemployment, as well as how the impact of crises varies depending on labor market 
institutions. We find that the flexibility of labor markets directly affects not only the 
magnitude but also the persistence of the impact of financial crises on unemployment.  
 
We test further the impact of labor market institutions on unemployment by estimating the 
impact of large-scale or gradual changes in labor market institutions on unemployment. The 
endogeneity of labor market reforms is a potentially important issue in estimating their 
impact on unemployment. We attempt to address this issue by using a couple of methods, 
which uncover some interesting facts. In particular, we find that change in labor market 
institutions are less likely to occur in more centralized political regimes that also are of 
duration, and that large-scale changes in labor market institutions policies can reduce 
unemployment by the same amount that financial crises increased it, albeit only after several 
years. Overall, the results suggest that labor market policies may play an important role in 
reducing unemployment over the medium term. These policies, however, have to be properly 
designed to also improve the quality of employment and to minimize possible negative short-
term effects, not investigated here, on inequality and job destruction. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the dataset and 
present key descriptive statistics. Section III analyzes the impact of financial crises on 
unemployment. Section IV assesses the effect of labor institutions in shaping the response 
of unemployment to financial crises. Section V analyzes the effect of labor market policies 
on unemployment outcomes. Section VI concludes. 
 
II.   DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Our data set covers a panel of 97 countries from 1980 to 2008. Data for labor market 
flexibility are taken from the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) 
database (Gwartney and Lawson, 2010), which provides a composite measure of labor 
market flexibility and indicators of labor market flexibility on six policy areas: (i) minimum 
wage (M), (ii) hiring and firing regulation (H), (iii) centralized collective wage 
bargaining (C), (iv) mandated cost of hiring (MCH), (v) mandated cost of work dismissal 
(MCW), and (vi) conscription (CO). All indicators are standardized on a 0–10 scale, with 
higher values of the indicator representing a more flexible labor market.  
 
The sources of the data for the other variables used in the empirical analysis are the IMF’s 
World Economic Outlook (WEO), the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), 
the Penn World Table version 7.0 by Heston et al., (2011), the database constructed by 
Laeven and Valencia (2010) on financial crisis occurrences (for banking, currency, and debt 
crises), and the database on political institutions by Keefer (2010). The full list of variables, 
definitions, and sources is provided in the Annex.
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Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the labor market flexibility indicators and the 
unemployment outcomes analyzed in the paper. For the composite labor market flexibility 
indicator we have a total of 1,214 observations, ranging from a minimum of 1.8 to a 
maximum of 9.5. Among the unemployment outcomes, we can notice that unemployment is 
mostly concentrated among young people (aged between 15 and 24). Table 2 shows that the 
correlation between unemployment outcomes and labor market flexibility. Indicators are in 
most of the cases negative and statistically significant, with hiring costs and youth 
unemployment having the strongest negative correlation.3  
 
Figure 2 sheds some light on the role played by labor market flexibility in shaping the 
response of unemployment to shocks. The first panel shows the increase in unemployment 
rate immediately following a financial crisis and the labor market indicator. As expected, 
economies that are characterized by a more flexible labor market have higher increase in 
unemployment in the short term, reflecting higher elasticity of unemployment to output. The 
second panel shows the cumulative changes in unemployment following a financial crisis, 
and the composite indicator of labor market flexibility. The negative relation between the 
medium-term effect of financial crises on unemployment and labor market flexibility 
suggests that labor market resilience to financial crises is a positive function of labor market 
flexibility. Thus, while unemployment tends to increase more after a financial crisis in the 
short term in countries with a more flexible labor market, the medium-term effect tends to be 
higher for countries characterized by a more rigid labor market. This hypothesis will be 
formally tested in the next section.  
 
                                                 
3 See Bernal-Verdugo et al., (2011) for empirical evidence on the effect of labor market flexibility on different 
unemployment outcomes. 
   
  
Figure 2. Increase in Unemployment Following a Crisis vs. Labor Market Flexibility 
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III.   THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL CRISES ON UNEMPLOYMENT 
A.   Methodology  
The dynamic impact of financial crises on unemployment is estimated following the 
approach proposed by Jorda (2005) and Teulings and Zubanov (2010), which allows the 
impulse response functions to be estimated directly. For each year k following the onset of 
the downturn, the estimation equation has the following form:  
 ௜ܷ,௧ା௞ െ ௜ܷ,௧ ൌ α௜௞ ൅ ∑ ߛ௝௞ଶ௝ୀଵ ∆ ௜ܷ,௧ି௝ ൅ β௞ܦ௜,௧ ൅ δԢࢄ௜,௧ ൅ ε௜,௧௞   (1) 
where ௜ܷ,௧ା௞ is the unemployment rate in country i in period t+k , ܦ௜,௧ is a downturn dummy 
that takes value 1 for the start of a financial crisis episode in period t in country i and zero 
otherwise,  α௜ represents country fixed effects that capture unobserved country-specific 
determinants of unemployment, ࢄ௜,௧ is a vector of control variables including the initial level 
of unemployment, the initial annual change of the share of urban population, the initial 
annual change of government spending as share of GDP, and a deterministic time trend. The 
coefficient γ௝ captures the persistence in changes in unemployment and β௞  measures the 
impact of the crisis on the change in unemployment for each future period k. Impulse 
Response functions (IRFs) are then obtained by least-squares dummy variable of β୩   for k = 
0, 1,…,6. Potential reverse causality is addressed by estimating changes in unemployment in 
the years that follow a financial crisis.4 
 
An alternative way of estimating the dynamic impact of financial crises on unemployment 
would be to estimate an Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) equation for the 
unemployment rate and crisis dummies, and to derive the IRFs from the estimated 
coefficients (Romer and Romer, 1989, 2010; Cerra and Saxena, 2008). However, the IRFs 
derived using an ARDL specification tend to be sensitive to the choice of the number of lags, 
and as a result tend to be unstable. In addition, long-lasting effects of shocks may be unduly 
found, reflecting the use of what Cai and Den Haan (2009) call one-type-of-shock models. 
By contrast, the approach used in the present paper does not suffer from these problems, 
because lagged changes in unemployment enter only as control variables and are not used to 
derive the IRFs, and because the structure of the equation does not impose permanent effects. 
The confidence bands associated with the estimated IRFs are also easily computed using the 
standard deviations of the estimated coefficients β୩ rather than requiring Monte Carlo 
simulations. 
 
                                                 
4 See Furceri and Zdzienicka (2010, 2011), and Duval et al. (2011) for a similar approach. 
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B.   Results 
Figure 3 shows a statistically significant and long-lasting increase in the unemployment rate 
following the occurrence of a financial crisis, by increasing the rate of unemployment by 
about 1 percent at the peak—three years after the occurrence of the crisis—and by about 
0.5 percent over the medium term—six years thereafter. Our findings are consistent with the 
evidence reported for OECD countries for which Furceri and Mourougane (2009) report an 
increase in unemployment of about 0.5–1 percent associated with financial crises, and 
Guichard and Rusticelli (2010) an increase of structural unemployment of about 
¾ percentage point.   
 
Financial crises have a slightly different effect on youth unemployment, with the higher 
increase at the peak of 2 percent, only one year after the occurrence of the crisis, and a 
statistically insignificant effect over the medium term. This could be due to shorter time-
series available for youth unemployment (compared to the overall unemployment rate), or to 
a particularly high medium-term negative effect of downturns on labor force participation for 
young workers, implying a lower medium- term effect of crises on youth unemployment than 
on overall unemployment (Duval et al., 2011). 
 
By contrast, the effect of financial crises on long-term unemployment is extremely persistent 
but becomes statistically significant only two years after the occurrence of a crisis. Over the 
medium term (six years after the crisis), long-term unemployment stabilizes at a level 
6 percentage points higher than the pre-crisis level, suggesting the existence of hysteresis 
effects. 
 
 
Figure 3. The Effect of Financial Crises on Unemployment Outcomes 
 (In percentage points) 
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Note: solid line represents the estimated IRF; dotted lines represent 95 percent confidence bands. 
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C.   Robustness Tests 
To check the robustness of the results, equation (1) was re-estimated by alternatively 
including (i) time fixed effects, (ii) regional fixed effects, and (iii) a country-specific time 
trend. As shown in Figure 4, the results using these different controls remain statistically 
significant and broadly unchanged. As an additional robustness check, we have also 
restricted the estimation sample to those countries for which data for change in 
unemployment are available for each period k to control for a possible composition bias 
derived from estimating equation (1) over an unbalanced set of countries. The results, not 
reported, remain statistically significant and qualitatively unchanged. 
 
 
Figure 4. The Effect of Financial Crises on Unemployment Outcomes: 
Robustness Check 
(In percentage points) 
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IV.   LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY AND THE RESPONSE OF UNEMPLOYMENT TO 
FINANCIAL CRISES  
To test the impact of labor market flexibility in shaping the effect of financial crises on 
unemployment, equation (1) was augmented to include labor market flexibility indicators (L) 
as a control and as an interaction term with the crisis dummy:  
 
  ௜ܷ,௧ା௞ െ ௜ܷ,௧ ൌ α௜௞ ൅ ∑ γ௝௞௟௝ୀଵ ∆ ௜ܷ,௧ି௝ ൅ β௞ܦ௜,௧ ൅ θܮ௜ ൅ Ԃ௞ܦ௜,௧൫ܮ௜,௧ െ ܮ௜൯ ൅ δ′ࢄ௜,௧ ൅ ε௜,௧௞  (2) 
 
Figure 5 presents the response of unemployment to financial crises, obtained considering the 
first (solid line) and third quartile (dotted line) of the distribution for different labor market 
flexibility indicators. The figure shows that the short-term impact of crises on unemployment 
is higher in countries with more flexible labor markets, while the medium-term effect is 
larger in countries with more rigid labor markets. This difference in the response is 
statistically significant both in the short and in the medium term (Table 3). Specifically, an 
increase of one point in the labor market flexibility composite indicator increases the short-
term effect of crises on unemployment by 0.4 percentage point, but reduces the medium term 
impact by about 0.6 percentage point. The results for the composite flexibility indicator are 
qualitatively similar for youth and long-term unemployment. Among the sub-indicators, 
hiring and firing regulations and centralized collective bargaining are the indicators with the 
largest medium term impact. As an additional robustness check, we have also restricted the 
estimation sample to those countries for which data for change in unemployment are 
available for each period k to control for a possible composition bias derived from estimating 
equation (3) over an unbalanced set of countries. The results, not reported, remain 
qualitatively unchanged. 
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Figure 5. The Role of Labor Market Flexibility in Shaping the Effect 
of Financial Crises on Unemployment  
(In percentage points) 
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V. LABOR MARKET POLICIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES 
A.   The Impact of Large-Scale Changes in Labor Market Institutions 
We  first estimate the impact of large-scale changes in labor market institutions by assuming 
that a large change takes place when, for a given country in a given time, the annual change 
in the composite labor market flexibility indicator exceeds by two standard deviations the 
average annual change over all observations. Because continuous annual data for our labor 
market flexibility indicators are not available for the majority of the countries in the sample 
before 2000, the identification of major policy change has been carried out during the period 
2000–08. The results, according to our identification strategy, suggest that during the last 
decade several countries have implemented major reforms of their labor market institutions 
and regulations.5 
To estimate the dynamic impact of labor market policies on unemployment we use a 
specification similar to equation (1):  
 ௜ܷ,௧ା௞ െ ௜ܷ,௧ ൌ α௜௞ ൅ ∑ γ௝௞௟௝ୀଵ ∆ ௜ܷ,௧ି௝ ൅ β௞ܴ௜,௧ ൅ δԢࢄ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧௞  (3) 
 
where ܴ௜,௧ is a dummy that takes value 1 for the start of a large-scale change in policy  in 
period t in country i and zero otherwise,   ࢄ௜,௧ is a vector of control variables including the 
initial level of unemployment, the crisis dummy used in the previous section, and a 
deterministic time trend.  β௞  measures the impact of the reform on the change in 
unemployment for each future period k.  
 
Figure 6 plots the IRFs obtained by using the least-squares dummy variable of β௞   for k = 
0, 1, …, 6. The figure shows that it takes, on average, about six years before the effects of 
labor market reforms on unemployment materialize, but the effects over the medium term are 
statistically significant and sizeable (Table 4).  
 
In particular, we find that labor market policies are associated with a decrease in 
unemployment of about ¾ percent over the medium term, which is similar in absolute terms 
to the increase in unemployment associated with financial crises (Figures 7–8). In other 
words, large-scale changes in labor market policies have the opposite effect of a financial 
crisis. 
  
                                                 
5 In particular, we have identified 48 episodes of large-scale labor market reforms mostly occurring during the 
past decade. The full list of episodes is available from the authors upon request. 
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Figure 6. The Role of Hiring and Firing Regulation in Shaping the Effect of Financial 
Crises on Youth and Long-Term Unemployment  
(In percentage points) 
 
 
             Youth Unemployment      Long-term Unemployment 
 
Note: ____ rigid labor market; _ _ _ _ flexible labor market; these correspond, respectively, to the 25th and 75th 
percentile of the distribution of the relevant indicator. 
 
 
 
 
     Figure 7. The effects of Reforms               Figure 8. The effects of Reforms vs. Crises 
           on Unemployment-OLS                    on unemployment-OLS 
 
Note: Solid line represents the estimated IRF; dotted lines represent 95 percent confidence bands. 
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Regarding youth and long-term unemployment, the medium-term estimates for the large-
scale changes associated with the composite flexibility indicator (Table 6) are statistically 
significant for youth unemployment but insignificant for long-term unemployment. Among 
the sub-indicators, we find that changes in minimum wages and mandated cost of hiring have 
a statistically significant impact on youth unemployment (Figure 9), while changes in hiring 
and firing regulation and conscription have a statistically significant medium-term impact on 
long-term unemployment. Overall, the results seem to suggest that labor market policies 
aimed at lowering hiring costs and reducing rigidity in hiring and firing regulation may have 
large and significant impact on unemployment outcomes. 
 
 
Figure 9. The Effects of Labor Market Policies on Unemployment-OLS  
(In percentage points) 
 
 
                Minimum Wage Mandated Cost of Hiring 
 
Note: Solid line represents the estimated IRF; dotted lines represent 95 percent confidence bands. 
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To address the endogeneity issue, we propose two strategies, which are both based on a 
Probit estimation of determinants of labor market policy. The first strategy consists of re-
estimating equation (3) by instrumenting the dummy R for those variables that we have found 
to be significantly correlated with the probability of changes in labor market institutions. The 
second approach consists of decomposing the effect of labor market policies on 
unemployment in two parts: the expected effect owing to all the variables which are affecting 
the probability of a change in labor market institutions, and the residual effect which can be 
thought of as the effect of the labor market policy itself: 
 ܴ௜,௧ ൌ ܴ௜,௧E ൅ ω௜,௧  (4) 
 
where ܴ௜,`௧E  represents the predicted probability of changes in labor market institutions, and 
ω௜,௧ is the error term of the Probit model. In particular, this decomposition distinguishes 
between the effect of an increase in the probability of a change in labor market institutions 
and the effect resulting from the change itself. As we estimate the probability of reform using 
the Probit model, this strategy is similar but not identical to directly adding to equation (3) all 
the variables used to predict the reform. 
 
Determinants of labor market policies 
 
The literature on the determinants of reforms has suggested that the probability of reforms 
depends on several macroeconomic (initial labor market and output growth conditions, 
economic size, trade openness, exchange rate regime, fiscal conditions) and political 
variables (ideology of the executive, the degree of decentralization and fractionalization in 
the political power, political stability, election cycles) (Alesina, 1987; Alesina and Drazen, 
1991; Curkierman and Tommasi, 1998; Saint-Paul, 2004; and Duval, 2008).  
 
Table 5 shows our estimation results for several Random Effect Probit models. In our 
baseline specification (column 1), we find that the pre-existing level of the labor market 
institutions index plays an important role in determining the probability of implementing a 
change in labor market institutions. Specifically, we find that the higher the quality of the 
existing labor market institutions, the less likely a country is to implement such a reform. 
Presumably, an economy with already flexible labor markets would not be in need of 
implementing further changes in labor market institutions, and would therefore be less likely 
to go through such an episode.  
 
A favorable economic situation (as measured by the GDP growth gap with respect to a five-
year moving average, gap_growth) is also found to decrease the probability of a change in 
policy occurring, although to a lesser extent. Intuitively, a country would display less appetite 
for changes in labor market institutions (in the presence of eventual political costs) when the  
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economy’s growth rate is above average. By contrast, other macroeconomic and 
demographic factors were not found to have a statistically significant effect. Interestingly, 
lagged unemployment rates do not seem to affect the probability of the implementation of 
large-scale changes, which implicitly suggests that reverse causality from unemployment to 
labor market policies may not be an issue.  
 
Among the political variables included in our estimations, we find that an increase in the 
degree of decentralization (e.g. going from a presidential system to one in which the 
president is elected by the assembly) is the variable that plays the most important role in 
increasing the probability of changes in labor market institutions. This is in line with the 
findings of Dabrowski and Gortat (2002) that the more politically liberal countries 
implemented relatively fast market reforms, while the more authoritative and centralized 
regimes tended to preserve economic institutions that favored the former communist 
oligarchy. Our findings contrast, however, with the results of Alesina et al., (2006) who show 
that strong executives (in unified governments and presidential systems) are more likely to 
swiftly implement fiscal and inflation stabilization programs than their less centralized 
counterparts.  
We also find empirical evidence that the length of time that the chief executive’s party has 
been in power has a negative effect on the probability of changes in labor market institutions. 
This variable can be interpreted as a measure of the dominance or preponderance that the 
official party has in the domestic politics of a country. As argued in the political science 
literature, dominant parties tend to promote reforms that protect their dominance, and to 
avoid the ones that tarnish it. For instance, Southall (1997) argues that dominant parties favor 
policies that increase their popularity at the expense of other, deeper, economic and industrial 
reforms. In light of electoral and other political costs associated with reforms that promote 
labor market flexibility, it would be natural for a dominant party to postpone such reforms, as 
evidenced by our results.  
Other political variables which feature prominently in the empirical literature—such as 
election cycles, political ideology, government fractionalization, measures of political 
stability, and the presence of a constitutional limit on the number of years the executive can 
serve before new elections—have been tested but proved to be statistically insignificant. 
 
Results 
 
First, we instrument labor market policies in equation (3) with the variables found to be 
significantly correlated with the probability of changes in labor market institutions, namely 
(i) the pre-existing level of the labor market institution index, (ii) the degree of 
decentralization in the executive power, (iii) the length of time the chief executive’s party has 
been in power, and (iv) a measure of the output gap. The results obtained using this approach 
are reported in Figure 9, and confirm the significant effect of labor market policies on 
unemployment over the medium term (the IRFs are statistically significant after five years). 
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The results also suggest a larger effect than that shown for the baseline, which is consistent 
with the fact that OLS estimates of  β௞ may be biased towards zero. In particular, the IV 
estimates suggest that labor market policies may lead to a reduction in unemployment of 
about 2.5 percentage points over the medium term. This result is robust to different 
specifications and estimates of the probability of changes in labor market institutions 
(Table 6). 
 
In our second approach, we decompose the medium-term effect of expected and non-
expected change in labor market institutions as in equation (4). Table 7 shows that the 
anticipated effect of changes in policy is considerably larger than the unpredicted component. 
However, the difference between the effect of expected and non-expected changes in labor 
market institutions is not statistically significant in most of the cases. Interestingly, the 
coefficient associated with the unanticipated effect is statistically significant in all 
specifications, and its magnitude is close to that obtained for the baseline regression.   
 
 
Figure 10. The Effects of Labor Market Policies on Unemployment-IV  
(In percentage points) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                     Note: Solid line represents the estimated IRF; dotted lines represent 95 percent confidence bands. 
 
 
 
C.   Gradual Changes in Labor Market Institutions 
Although the use of a large threshold has the advantage of limiting measurement error in the 
identification of substantial policy changes, and of reducing the possibility of reverse 
causality, it may also prevent identification of those change in labor market institutions  that 
are spread over a longer period. In practice, however, gradual reforms are much more 
difficult to identify; they also tend to occur less frequently (Duval, 2008). As noted by Duval 
(2008), “certain reforms start small before getting big over the years and therefore cannot be 
associated with any specific year. One example is the slow but quasi continuous decline in 
tax wedges in Denmark between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s or in Finland since the 
mid-1990s.” 
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To address this issue, and to check the robustness of our results, we re-estimate equation (3), 
replacing the dummy variable associated with the occurrence of large-scale changes (ܴ௜,௧ሻ 
with the change in the labor market flexibility indicator (∆ܮ௜,௧ሻ: 
 ௜ܷ,௧ା௞ െ ௜ܷ,௧ ൌ α௜௞ ൅ ∑ γ௝௞௟௝ୀଵ ∆ ௜ܷ,௧ି௝ ൅ β௞∆ܮ௜,௧ ൅ δԢࢄ௜,௧ ൅ ε௜,௧௞  (5) 
 
By estimating equation (5) we can quantify the effect of gradual changes in labor market 
flexibility on unemployment. The first panel of Figure 11 presents the IRFs obtained when 
equation (5) is estimated using OLS. The results are in line with those obtained in Figure 6, 
and suggest that an increase of one point in the labor market flexibility indicator decreases 
unemployment by about 0.5 percent over the medium term. The effect tends to be larger 
when changes in the labor market flexibility composite indicator are instrumented for those 
variables that we have found to be significantly correlated with the probability of reforms. In 
particular, the IRFs reported in the second panel of Figure 11 suggest that an increase of one 
point in the labor market flexibility composite indicator decreases unemployment by about 
1.2 percent over the medium term. 
 
 
Figure 11. The Effects of Gradual Labor Market Policies on Unemployment 
 (In percentage points) 
 
 
                OLS IV 
 
 
Note: Solid line represents the estimated IRF; dotted lines represent 95 percent confidence bands. 
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VI.   CONCLUSIONS 
Using a novel panel data set for a large number of countries, this paper shows that the impact 
of financial crises on unemployment largely depends on the flexibility of labor market 
institutions. Impulse responses show that in countries with more flexible labor markets, the 
impact of financial crises is sharper but short-lived. Conversely, in countries with more rigid 
labor markets, the effect of financial crises appears to be initially more subdued, but highly 
persistent. The effects are more pronounced for youth unemployment in the short term, 
perhaps underscoring their higher vulnerability as well as declining labor market 
participation in the medium term. The impact on long-term unemployment was found to be 
very pronounced in the medium term, highlighting potential hysteresis effects of financial 
crises on unemployment. 
 
The paper also provides some evidence that large upfront, or gradual but significant 
comprehensive labor market policies may reduce unemployment, albeit only in the medium 
term. The positive impact of labor market policies is particularly pronounced for the young. 
The adoption of such labor market policies is less likely in more centralized political regimes 
that are long-lasting, and when institutions are already more flexible and economic 
conditions relatively good. 
 
The results, however, raise the issue of the design and possible sequence of such reforms.  
Employment protection should be designed in such a way as to internalize social costs and 
not inhibit job creation and labor reallocation, to also improve the quality of employment and 
to minimize possible negative short-term effects, not investigated in this paper, on inequality 
and job destruction. Micro- and macro-studies on OECD countries over the past decade show 
that it is important to protect workers, rather than jobs, by coupling unemployment benefits 
with pressure on the unemployed to take jobs and measures to help them (Blanchard, 2006). 
Moreover, artificial restrictions on individual employment contracts should also be avoided.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Labor Market Outcomes and Flexibility Indicators 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Labor market outcomes 
Unemployment 2826 8.9 5.9 0.0 37.3 
Long-term unemployment 984 33.8 18.3 0.5 84.9 
Youth unemployment 1669 17.6 10.5 0.7 70.9 
Labor market flexibility 
Composite index 1214 5.9 1.5 1.8 9.5 
Minimum wage 1135 6.2 2.7 0.0 10.0 
Hiring and firing regulations 1056 4.7 1.5 1.0 8.8 
Centralized collective bargaining 1124 6.4 1.5 1.8 9.5 
Mandated cost of hiring 1166 6.9 2.0 1.9 10.0 
Mandated cost of worker dismissal 927 5.8 3.1 0.0 10.0 
Conscription 1656 5.9 4.3 0.0 10.0 
 
Source: Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) database. 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix of Labor Market Outcomes and Flexibility Indicators 
 U YU LU L M H C MCH MCW CO 
U 1          
YU 0.51*** 1         
LU 0.90*** 0.56*** 1        
L -0.11*** -0.22*** -0.13*** 1       
M -0.22*** -0.19*** -0.15*** 0.64*** 1      
H -0.21*** -0.24*** -0.21*** 0.44*** 0.26*** 1     
C 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.46*** 0.17*** 0.54*** 1    
MCH -0.02 -0.31*** -0.02 0.63*** 0.43*** 0.28** 0.30*** 1   
MCW 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.47*** 0.13*** 0.19** 0.061 -0.02 1  
CO 0.01 -0.11** -0.04 0.70*** 0.20*** -0.09*** 0.03 0.32*** 0.06* 1 
 
Note: U=unemployment; YU= youth unemployment; LU=long-term unemployment; L=composite labor market 
flexibility index; M= minimum wage; H=hiring and firing regulation; C=centralized collective bargaining; 
MCH=mandated cost of hiring; MCW=mandated cost of work dismissal; CO= conscription.  
*, **,*** denote significance at 10percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 3. Short- and Medium-Term Effects of Financial Crises on Unemployment: Flexible vs. Rigid Labor Markets 
 
 L M H C MCH MCW CO 
 Initial effect 
Crisis 1.314 
(4.43)*** 
1.392 
(4.86)*** 
1.315 
(4.33)*** 
1.834 
(3.49)*** 
1.503 
(4.47)*** 
2.116 
(6.04) 
1.254 
(3.36)*** 
Crisis*Flexibility 
indicator 
 
0.395 
(2.26)** 
0.078 
(0.69) 
0.300 
(1.60)* 
0.300 
(1.60)* 
0.160 
(1.22) 
0.149 
(1.60)* 
-0.028 
(-0.46) 
 Medium term effect 
Crisis -0.260 
(-0.50) 
0.019 
(0.02) 
-0.043 
(-0.10) 
-0.805 
(-1.47) 
-0.394 
(-0.61) 
-1.110 
(-3.12)*** 
0.179 
(0.32) 
Crisis*Flexibility 
indicator 
 
-0.564 
(-2.14)** 
-0.201 
(-0.58) 
-0.441 
(-1.87)* 
-0.441 
(-1.87)* 
-0.354 
(-1.41) 
-0.402 
(-6.81)*** 
-0.324 
(-3.16)*** 
 
Note: L=composite labor market flexibility index; M= minimum wage; H=hiring and firing regulation; C=centralized collective bargaining; MCH=mandated 
cost of hiring; MCW=mandated cost of work dismissal; CO= conscription. T-statistics based on robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *,**,*** 
denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 4. Medium-Term Effect of Labor Market Policies—OLS 
 L M H C MCH MCW CO 
 Unemployment 
Reform t -0.740 
(-3.05)*** 
-0.844 
(-4.07)*** 
0.516 
(1.38) 
-0.387 
(-0.88) 
-0.900 
(-5.52)*** 
0.040 
(0.12) 
-0.220 
(-0.28) 
 Youth Unemployment 
Reform t -1.908 
(-3.64)*** 
-1.983 
(-4.64)*** 
0.349 
(0.38) 
-1.207 
(-0.62) 
-1.921 
(-4.53)*** 
n.a. -1.627 
(-0.56) 
Long-term unemployment 
Reform t -0.621 
(-0.54) 
-0.073 
(-0.07) 
-7.283 
(-4.02)*** 
-1.728 
(-0.71) 
-0.410 
(-0.30) 
n.a. -6.225 
(-1.88)* 
 
Note: L=composite labor market flexibility index; M= minimum wage; H=hiring and firing regulation; C=centralized collective  
bargaining; MCH=mandated cost of hiring; MCW=mandated cost of work dismissal; CO= conscription. T-statistics based on robust 
clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 5. Probability of Large-Scale Changes in Labor Market Institutions 
 
  (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) 
l.area5b -0.241 -0.253 -0.240 -0.210 -0.238 -0.243 -0.266 
  (-4.22)*** (-3.93)*** (-4.20)*** (-4.16)*** (-4.42)*** (-4.25)*** (-4.01)*** 
gap_growth -0.046 -0.065 -0.046 -0.046 -0.049 -0.046 -0.064 
  (-2.20)** (-2.40)** (-2.20)** (-2.19)** (-2.50)** (-2.20)** (-2.37)** 
system 0.268 0.244 0.269 0.279 0.281 0.269 0.269 
  (2.89)*** (2.33)** (2.87)*** (2.90)*** (3.25)*** (2.91)*** (2.70)*** 
prtyin -0.013 -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 -0.001 -0.013 -0.009 
  (-1.81)* (-1.51) (-1.81)* (-1.84)* (-1.13) (-1.82)* (-1.25) 
l.lur - -0.012 - - - - -0.010 
  (-0.78) (-0.63) 
lnpop - - 0.006 - - - -0.023 
  (0.12) (-0.35) 
lnopenk - - - -0.025 -- - -0.101 
  (-0.14) (-0.44) 
lncg - - - - -0.050 - 0.014 
  (-0.24) (0.05) 
d.l.cg - - - - - 0.054 0.288 
  (0.72) (1.74)* 
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 
       
N 667 510 667 667 667 667 510 
 
Note: Z-statistics based on robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote significance at 
10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 6. Medium-term Effect of Labor Market Policies-IV Robustness Checks 
 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) 
Policy t -2.478 
(-4.76)*** 
-2.478 
(-4.76)*** 
-1.991 
(-3.92)*** 
-2.456 
(-4.81)*** 
-2.512 
(-4.81)*** 
-2.358 
(-4.71)*** 
-1.879 
(-3.84)*** 
Controls        
௜ܷ,௧ -1.546 
(-10.23)*** 
-1.546 
(-10.23)*** 
-1.553 
(-10.33)*** 
-1.546 
(-10.24)*** 
-1.546 
(-10.22)*** 
-1.548 
(-10.25)*** 
-1.554 
(-10.35)*** 
∆ ௜ܷ,௧ିଵ 0.462 
(3.50)*** 
0.462 
(3.50)*** 
0.459 
(3.47)*** 
0.462 
(3.50)*** 
0.462 
(3.50)*** 
0.461 
(3.49)*** 
0.458 
(3.47)*** 
∆ ௜ܷ,௧ିଶ 0.347 
(3.34)*** 
0.347 
(3.34)*** 
0.349 
(3.41)*** 
0.347 
(3.34)*** 
0.347 
(3.33)*** 
0.348 
(3.36)*** 
0.349 
(3.43)*** 
Crisis dummies 0.591 
(1.38) 
0.591 
(1.38) 
0.591 
(1.38) 
0.591 
(1.38) 
0.591 
(1.38) 
0.591 
(1.38) 
0.590 
(1.38) 
        
R2 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.85 
N 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 
 
Note: T-statistics based on robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent,  
respectively. Each column corresponds to the different Probit estimates reported in Table 4.  
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Table 7. Medium-Term Effect of Labor Market Policies—Expected vs. Non-expected  
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) 
Policy t        
Anticipated -3.795 
(-2.26)** 
-3.652 
(-2.31)** 
-3.792 
(-2.26)** 
-3.806 
(-2.27)** 
-3.806 
(-2.27)** 
-3.753 
(-2.25)** 
-3.480 
(-2.38)** 
Non- 
anticipated 
-0.721 
(-2.90)*** 
-0.710 
(-2.83)*** 
-0.721 
(-2.90)*** 
-0.721 
(-2.90)*** 
-0.721 
(-2.90)*** 
-0.720 
(-2.89)*** 
-0.694 
(-2.77)*** 
Controls        
௜ܷ,௧ -1.576 
(-6.93)*** 
-1.581 
(-6.91)*** 
-1.576 
(-6.93)*** 
-1.576 
(-6.93)*** 
-1.576 
(-6.93)*** 
-1.576 
(-6.92)*** 
-1.580 
(-6.89)*** 
∆ ௜ܷ,௧ିଵ 0.427 
(2.33)** 
0.438 
(2.37)** 
0.427 
(2.33)** 
0.427 
(2.33)** 
0.427 
(2.33)** 
0.428 
(2.33)** 
0.442 
(2.38)** 
∆ ௜ܷ,௧ିଶ 0.349 
(2.63)*** 
0.348 
(2.61)** 
0.349 
(2.63)*** 
0.349 
(2.64)*** 
0.349 
(2.64)*** 
0.350 
(2.64)*** 
0.354 
(2.67)*** 
Crisis dummies 0.636 
(1.12) 
0.649 
(1.15) 
0.637 
(1.12) 
0.637 
(1.12) 
0.637 
(1.12) 
0.637 
(1.12) 
0.657 
(1.16) 
        
R2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 
N 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 
 
Note: T-statistics based on robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
Each column corresponds to the different Probit estimates reported in Table 4.  
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ANNEX—DATA  
The dependent and control variables included in the analysis belong to one of several 
categories, namely: 
 
Unemployment 
 Unemployment rate (lur, from WEO): Percentage of the total labor force that is currently 
unemployed. 
 Youth unemployment rate (unempyouth, from WDI): Percentage of the total labor force 
of ages 15 to 24 that is currently unemployed. 
 Long-term unemployment (unemplong, from WDI): Fraction (in percent) of the 
unemployment rate that is of long-term. 
 
Macroeconomic variables 
 GDP per capita (rgdpl, from WEO): Purchasing power parity (PPP) converted GDP per 
capita (with the Laspeyres methodology), derived from growth rates of private 
consumption, government expenditures, and investment at 2005 constant prices. 
 Demand pressure (gap_growth_n): Gap in the current real GDP per capita growth with 
respect to a moving average of n years, centered at the current period. 
 Government size (lncg, from PWT): (log) Government consumption share of PPP 
converted GDP per capita at current prices, in percent. 
 Openness (lnopenk, from PWT): (log) Openness at 2005 constant prices, in percent. 
 
Demographic variables 
 Population size (lnpop, from PWT): (log) Total population (in thousands). 
 Urbanization (lnurbpop, from WDI): (log) Urban population, as percent of total 
population. 
 Density (lnpopdens, from WDI): (log) Population density, measured by the number of 
people per square kilometer of land area. 
 
Political institutions 
 Executive system (system): Assigns values of 0 if the system is “presidential”, 1 if there 
is an Assembly-elected President, and 2 if the system is “parliamentary”. 
 Length of party of executive chief in office (prtyin): Number of years that the party of the 
executive chief is in the office.  
 
Financial crisis 
 Financial crisis indicator (crisis): This dummy variable assigns a value of 1 to years in 
which a country was going through a financial crisis according to Laeven and Valencia 
(2010), and 0 otherwise. 
